



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Meeting of the Interdepartmental Group
on START Policy

March 3, 1983

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

State
RADM Jonathan T. Howe (Chairman)

NSC
Sven Kraemer

ACDA
James George

OSD
Ronald Lehman

CIA
[Redacted]

Commissioner
Ambassador Ellis

JCS
BG Elmer Brooks

The IG reviewed the issues arising from the SCC Working Group's papers completed to date. Ambassador Ellis summarized the results of the last SCC session, identifying the SS-16, ABM Treaty Review, and Concurrent Operations discussions as the major issues of the round.

On the issue of responding to the Soviets on Peacekeeper, there was general agreement that there should be some U.S. response. There was further discussion on how this should be handled, whether outside the SCC through a letter from Ambassador Ellis to General Starodubov, or within the SCC in the context of a broader discussion of future modernization plans. Whether or not the letter drafted by Ambassador Ellis to General Starodubov should be sent was identified as an issue for the NSC.

On concurrent operations, there was general agreement on the desirability of officially clarifying in the negotiated common understanding the "exceptional circumstances" under which air defense radars could be turned on during the launching of a strategic ballistic missile into the test range or an ABM interceptor at the test range. There was discussion over whether to seek formal Soviet acknowledgement in the upcoming round of the "exceptional circumstances" language through plenary statements, through a new common understanding, or through changes to the existing common understanding. Pending a final agency review, this may or may not be an issue for the NSC.

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After the CIA representative provided an update on the SS-16 issue, there was agreement that the U.S. would raise the issue again, particularly pointing out the inadequacies of the previous Soviet response. State agreed to consider raising diplomatically the issue of Soviet non-responsiveness to U.S. questions in the SCC, with the SS-16 issue a prime example.

There was no agreement reached on whether or not to close out SCC session XXII. This matter was identified as an issue for the NSC. There was agreement not to raise the SSBN dismantling issue at the SCC. There also was agreement that the U.S. should continue to raise the BWC issue in a manner similar to past practice.

On telemetry encryption, it was generally agreed that the U.S. will await the Soviet response to our questions on RS-22 encryption practices and that we would not respond at this time to Soviet questions about which encrypted channels caused us the most concern.

ACDA was requested to prepare press guidance and a fact sheet on the question of Soviet statements on their interim restraint policy.

In summary, there are two and possibly three issues for NSC decision: Peacekeeper response, SCC session XXII close-out, and possibly concurrent operations. ACDA will circulate draft delegation instructions and an issue paper for the NSC that will highlight both consensus and unresolved issues.

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